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THE SPECIALTY BOARDS AND ANTITRUST: A
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
John J. Smith, M.D.*
Health care in the United States is a vast, sophisticated undertaking,
which touches the lives of all Americans. At the heart of the medical
system is the American physician, arguably the best-trained health pro-
fessional in the world. Today, most American physicians are specialists,
concentrating on a particular type of medicine. These specialists affect
the character, quality, and costs of medical care.
Despite the influence of specialty medicine, its practice is essentially
unregulated by government. Instead, a comprehensive private system has
emerged to train and credential specialists. This system is largely based
on the standards created by the twenty-four specialty boards recognized
by the American Board of Medical Specialties. These private organiza-
tions assess a physician's skill through an evaluation and examination
process, which uses criteria established by the boards themselves. Suc-
cessful candidates are considered "board certified" specialists, a status
with important implications.
Certification is a voluntary process and is not legally required to prac-
tice medicine in any jurisdiction. Likewise, neither the boards nor any
other national medical organization encourages health care institutions to
limit specialty practice to certified physicians alone. These realities
notwithstanding, the private standards of the boards have a profound ef-
fect on physicians' practice opportunities, an effect that raises a variety of
antitrust issues.
I. THE SPECIALTY BOARD SYSTEM
Specialty training and board certification are more important than ever
in the practice of medicine. More than ninety percent of United States
* The author completed a six-year program in medicine and law at the University of
Virginia in May 1993, and is currently a resident in Diagnostic Radiology and Nuclear
Medicine at the University of Virginia Health Sciences Center. The author would like to
thank Professors Glen 0. Robinson and Walter J. Wadlington of the University of Virginia
School of Law for their invaluable assistance in developing this project.
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medical school graduates complete a formal period of specialized post-
graduate training in the form of a "residency,"' and ninety-one percent of
recent graduates are either board-certified or seeking board certifica-
tion.' This broad acceptance has enabled certification to have a signifi-
cant impact on hospital privileges, peer and patient recognition, economic
compensation, and the standard of care.
A. The Basics of Certification
As defined by the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), a
specialty board is a separately incorporated, financially independent body
that determines its requirements and policies for certification, selects the
members of its governing body in accordance with the procedures stipu-
lated in its bylaws, accepts its candidates for certification from persons
who fulfill its stated requirements, administers examinations, and issues
certificates to those who submit and pass its evaluations.' Today, there
are 24 ABMS-recognized boards.4 These boards have generally estab-
lished a three-step process for obtaining certification: (1) graduation
from a Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME) accredited
medical school or its equivalent; (2) completion of an Accreditation
Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) accredited resi-
dency; and (3) passage of a certification examination. Even after certifi-
1. Medical education undertaken after completion of medical school is often referred
to as "postgraduate" medical education. It typically involves a residency, a period of three
or more years, during which a new physician learns a specialty under the supervision of
experienced physicians.
2. History of Accreditation of Medical Education Programs, 250 JAMA 1502, 1506
(1983) [hereinafter History of Accreditation].
3. ABMS is composed of the 24 specialty boards, the American Medical Association,
the American Hospital Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the
Council of Medical Specialty Societies, the Federation of State Medical Boards, and addi-
tional public representation. Recognition of a board by the ABMS requires approval by
the Liaison Committee for Specialty Boards (LCSB), a committee composed of the ABMS
and the American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Medical Education. AMERI-
CAN BD. OF MEDICAL SPECIALTIES RESEARCH & EDUCATION FOUNDATION, 1992 AN-
NUAL REPORT AND REFERENCE HANDBOOK 43, 94 (1992) [hereinafter ABMS
HANDBOOK]. Essentially, ABMS recognition amounts to acceptance of a board by main-
stream organized medicine.
4. Specialty boards exist for Allergy and Immunology, Anesthesiology, Colon and
Rectal Surgery, Dermatology, Emergency Medicine, Family Practice, Internal Medicine,
Medical Genetics, Neurological Surgery, Nuclear Medicine, Obstetrics and Gynecology,
Ophthalmology, Orthopedic Surgery, Otolaryngology, Pathology, Pediatrics, Physical
Medicine and Rehabilitation, Plastic Surgery, Preventative Medicine, Psychiatry and Neu-
rology, Radiology, Surgery, Thoracic Surgery, and Urology. Id.
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cation is achieved, the boards are likely to continue to affect a physician's
practice, since most boards now require periodic recertification.
1. LCME Accredited Medical School
Candidates for certification must complete undergraduate medical edu-
cation at an LCME-accredited medical school or its equivalent.5 The
LCME includes representatives of the AMA, the Association of Ameri-
can Medical Colleges (AAMC), the Committee for Accreditation of Ca-
nadian Medical Schools, the federal government, and medical students.6
There is no explicit specialty board involvement at this level of medical
education.
2. ACGME Accredited Residency
A second requirement for board certification is postgraduate training
in an ACGME-accredited residency.7 As described in the AMA's Direc-
tory of Graduate Medical Education, the primary purpose of accredita-
tion is to provide a professional judgment as to the quality of an
educational program, thus assuring the potential candidate that the pro-
gram meets the standard set by professionals in that specialty.' While
ACGME accreditation is a key requirement for certification, it has great
importance in medicine generally, as the AMA and other professional
organizations implicitly recommend residency training before a physician
undertakes independent practice.9
The ACGME is composed of the AMA, AAMC, ABMS, the Ameri-
can Hospital Association (AHA), and the Council of Medical Specialty
Societies (CMSS, an organization composed of the various medical spe-
cialty societies), as well as nonvoting representatives of the public and
federal government.10 ACGME accreditation requirements and deci-
5. Graduates from a medical school accredited by the American Osteopathic Associ-
ation will also qualify.
6. History of Accreditation, supra note 2, at 1504.
7. Some intimately familiar with the certification and accreditation process feel that
specialty programs can be accredited without concurrent existence of certification pro-
grams, especially in small subspecialties in which a full certification mechanism is probably
unwarranted. See, e.g., John A. Benson, Jr., Certification and Recertification: One Ap-
proach to Professional Accountability, 114 ANN. IrnR. MED. 238, 241 (1991).
8. AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION DIRECTORY 1993-
1994 9 (1993) [hereinafter AMA DIRECTORY].
9. Revision of the General Requirements of the Essentials of Accredited Residencies
in Graduate Medical Education, in AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, DIRECTORY OF GRADU-
ATE MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS 1992-93, 16 (1992).
10. AMA DIRECTORY, supra note 8, at 1.
1994]
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sions in individual specialties are made in conjunction with the appropri-
ate Residency Review Committee (RRC), a specialty-specific committee
including representatives of the AMA, the concerned specialty board,
and relevant specialty societies."
The specialty boards influence ACGME decisions at several levels.
They are represented on the ACGME by the ABMS, and are important
members of their respective RRCs. Another powerful influence is the
certification standards themselves: as board certification is generally the
ultimate goal for physicians-in-training, accreditation standards for their
training programs almost always come to reflect certification standards.
3. Certification By A Specialty Board
Following graduation from an LCME-accredited medical school or its
equivalent, and successful completion of an ACGME-accredited resi-
dency, a physician seeking certification must satisfy the clinical profi-
ciency and examination requirements of the certifying board for his or
her specialty. Due to their subjective nature, clinical competence evalua-
tions are rarely invoked to deny certification.12 Consequently, the final
requirements for board certification are generally met by successful per-
formance on written examinations, and in some cases, on oral examina-
tions as well.
4. Recertification
Originally, certification was a one-time process: once certified, a physi-
cian was certified for life. Faced with criticism that this system did little
to encourage physicians to keep current with medical knowledge, the
ABMS passed a statement endorsing the principle of recertification in
1973.13 By 1992,. most specialty boards had adopted mandatory recertifi-
11. See Joseph N. Ewing, Jr., Standards Affecting Training Programs, in LEGAL As-
PECTS OF CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION, 87, 89 (Donald G. Langsley ed., 1983).
There are actually two types of ACGME accreditation requirements: general and special.
General requirements are applicable to all residency programs, while special requirements
are specialty-specific. Decisions regarding special requirements are made by the ACGME,
acting on the proposal of the appropriate RRC. See AMA DIRECTORY, supra note 8, at 9.
Accreditation decisions on individual programs may be made either by the ACGME itself
or delegated by the ACGME to an RRC. Id. at 1.
12. A recent study noted that only 2.5% of certification candidates in Internal
Medicine did not receive satisfactory clinical ratings from their residency programs, while
approximately 27% of first-time applicants failed the written examination. John M. Eisen-
berg, Evaluating Internists' Clinical Competence, 4 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 139, 140 (1989).
13. AMERICAN BD. OF MEDICAL SPECIALTIES RESEARCH & EDUC. FOUND., 1993 AN-
NUAL REPORT & REFERENCE HANDBOOK 69 (1993).
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cation requirements.14 This system largely functions by issuing "time lim-
ited" certificates (i.e., certificates that expire after a period of several
years), and by making new certificates contingent on passing a recertifica-
tion examination.
B. Implications of Certification
The specialty board system amounts: to'a voluntary, private system of
specialty regulation which uniformly applies various standards to physi-
cian-applicants. It is largely controlled by the AMA, ABMS, and the spe-
cialty boards themselves, with essentially no direct government oversight.
The system's overwhelming acceptance by the medical profession has
caused it to become widely pervasive and influential in American medical
practice, with implications for virtually all U.S. physicians.
1. The Position of the Boards
Specialty boards tend to minimize certification's impact on medical
practitioners and the practice of medicine. The American Board of Inter-
nal Medicine (ABIM) views certification as recognition of a number of
years of specialty training and the demonstration of medical knowledge
and clinical judgment, the latter established by an examination adminis-
tered by the Board. 5 Individual boards and the ABMS stress that the
boards do not grant licenses to practice medicine, nor have they been
delegated to do so by any state legislature. 16 They also emphasize that
certification is not necessary to practice a specialty or subspecialty. 7
A respected authority on certification, John A. Benson, Jr., M.D., has
noted that board certification has practical implications that the specialty
boards cannot control. 8 These practical implications include salary ben-
efits, lower malpractice insurance rates, admission to hospital staffs, elec-
tion to membership in professional societies, and credibility in expert
testimony.'9 Dr. Benson feels that specialty boards cannot ignore these
very real implications of certification in considering the potential effects
14. Donald G. Langsley, Medical Competence and Performance Assessment, 266
JAMA 977, 978 (1991).
15. Goussis v. Kimball, 813 F. Supp. 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing to affidavit of
John J. Norcini, Jr., M.D., Vice President for Evaluation and Research of the ABIM)
[hereinafter Norcini Affidavit].
16. Id. (rejecting plaintiff's claim that denial of ABIM certification in endocrinology
and metabolism subspecialties involved state action).
17. Id.
18. Benson, supra note 7, at 239.
19. Id.
1994]
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of their certificates.2 0
2. Practical Implications of Board Certification
As Dr. Benson has noted, there are numerous real-world benefits of
board certification. These benefits, the result of broad professional ac-
ceptance of the system, explain why nearly all U.S. physicians voluntarily
subject themselves to specialty training and the board certification pro-
cess. These same implications indicate the real power that certification
and the specialty boards have assumed in the health care system.
Perhaps the most fundamental and important benefit of board certifi-
cation is hospital staff privileges. Such privileges allow a physician to ad-
mit patients and practice medicine in an institution. These privileges are
important for all physicians, but they are crucial to specialists whose prac-
tice absolutely requires the facilities of a hospital, such as surgeons or
anesthesiologists. Accordingly, hospital privileges have very real eco-
nomic implications to the individual physician.
Hospitals will often limit categories of work to board-certified special-
ists, effectively shutting out noncertified physicians.21 The AHA has en-
couraged hospitals to use certification as an important factor in the
decision to grant privileges.2 The federal government, through the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), also recognizes certifica-
tion as an important element in granting staff privileges. However,
HCFA specifically prohibits using certification as the sole criteria for
granting privileges.23
The ABMS, in its statement on "Delineation of Staff Privileges," does
recognize that board certification may be used as "only" one of several
factors in determining staff privileges.24 It emphasizes, however, that
there is no specific requirement that a physician be board-certified in a
specialty or subspecialty in order to practice that skill in a hospital. In
closing, the ABMS statement stresses that staff privileges are an institu-
tional responsibility and are distinctly separate from the certification
20. Id.
21. STEVEN JONAS, MEDICAL MYSTERY: THE TRAINING OF DOCTORS IN THE UNITED
STATES 231 (1978).
22. See ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 253
(1971).
23. Gerald E. Thomson, The Future Effects of Failure to Be Certified, in AMERICAN
BD. OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, SUMMER CONFERENCE REPORT 1989 44 (1989).
24. ABMS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 52-53.
25. Id.
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process.26
Peer recognition is another benefit of board certification. 27 Besides be-
ing obvious grounds for recognition by fellow board-certified physicians,
board certification is often a prerequisite for membership in prestigious
professional societies.2 1 Membership in these societies may be all but
necessary to advance professionally and academically in certain
specialties.2 9
Patients may also look to board certification in seeking a physician.
Today's patients, especially the more educated and affluent, will often
bypass generalists to deal directly with a specialist.30 In such an environ-
ment, a physician who is not board-certified may be subject to a competi-
tive disadvantage vis-a-vis his or her certified peers.31
Board-certified physicians are widely believed to enjoy higher salaries
than their noncertified peers. As early as the 1930s, specialists were rec-
ognized as having consistently higher incomes than general practition-
ers.32 Some commentators believe that board-certified specialists earn
more only because they work more hours than nonboard-certified
peers.33 Others, however, note a significant income advantage to board
certification without such qualifications. 34
Finally, board certification has an impact on medical malpractice, in
establishing both the standards for expert testimony and the standard of
practice for the physician accused of malpractice. Some feel that board-
certified practitioners are held to a higher standard of care, a standard
which crosses over the arbitrary line of the old "locality" rule.35 Others
see certification having an impact upon the entire malpractice proceed-
26. Id.
27. Benson, supra note 7, at 239.
28. Id.
29. See Treister v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 396 N.E.2d 1225 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979).
30. STEVENS, supra note 22, at 196.
31. Note that here the effect of board certification may not be as strong as recognition
in the peer context, as there are numerous non-ABMS boards that may be willing to certify
a physician not certified by an ABMS board. In addition, a physician may be able to hold
him or herself out to the public as a specialist, regardless of certification status. In any
event, even relatively sophisticated health care consumers may be unaware of the differ-
ence between a non-ABMS board certified physician and one certified by an ABMS board.
32. STEVENS, supra note 22, at 176.
33. Benson, supra note 7, at 241.
34. Thomson, supra note 23, at 45.
35. See, e.g., Buck v. St. Clair, 702 P.2d 781, 785 (Idaho 1985) (holding that the local
standard of care for "nationally board-certified specialists" is the same as the national stan-
dard of care).
19941
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ing, affecting the thinking and decisions of both judges and juries.3 6
II. BASIC ANTITRUST DoCrRINE
The United States has a longstanding national policy against economic
arrangements that restrain interstate trade. The extensive, nationwide
scheme of private regulation that is the specialty board system carries
with it the potential to restrain such trade, and thus invoke liability under
the Sherman Antitrust Act and related legislation.
A. Statutory Basis
The national policy against arrangements in restraint of interstate trade
is largely found in the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-
vides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."37 As interpreted by the
courts, a Section 1 claim requires three elements: (1) a contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy; (2) restraint of trade; and (3) an effect on interstate
commerce.38
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides a mandate against persons who
monopolize or attempt to monopolize.39 Courts interpreting this provi-
sion have recognized two factors necessary for a successful action: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident.40
The Sherman Act also requires that the activity under scrutiny affect
interstate commerce. Today, this "effects test" is very lenient, satisfied
even in instances where the activity has a predominantly local effect.41
36. Thomson, supra note 23, at 45.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
38. Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 812 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
40. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 825 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966)).
41. See, e.g., Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 383 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985) (finding the effects test satisfied in an antitrust challenge to a hospi-
tal's peer review system). The plaintiff physician alleged that he treated out-of-state pa-
tients, purchased medicine, equipment, and medical supplies from out-of-state purveyors,
derived revenues from Medicare, Medicaid, and out-of-state private insurance companies,
and paid management and accounting fees to out-of-state consultants. Id.
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B. Judicial Interpretation
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Sherman Act and re-
lated federal antitrust actions, while the United States Supreme Court is
the ultimate interpreter of the underlying statutes.42 The Court has rec-
ognized that the language of the Sherman Act cannot be read literally, as
such an interpretation would reach virtually every contract and agree-
ment in the economy. Accordingly, the Sherman Act is seen as granting
antitrust jurisdiction to the federal courts, with broad yet. fluid coverage.
The initial antitrust analysis employed by the Court came to be known
as the "rule of reason." As articulated in Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, the test is:
... whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the 'reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts.43
Thus, a court applying this test is free to consider the facts and circum-
stances of the restraint at issue.
Subsequently, the Court developed a more stringent test to evaluate
restraints recognized as having predominantly anticompetitive effects.
As explained in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, the "per se"
rule covers: ". . . certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use."'  Practices that are generally subject to this analy-
sis include horizontal and vertical price fixing agreements, horizontal ter-
ritorial restrictions, tying arrangements, and certain group boycotts.45
42. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373
(1985).
43. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
44. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
45. United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288,299 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993). Vertical arrangements are those between busi-
nesses and their suppliers and/or distributors; horizontal arrangements involve businesses
competing in the same type of economic activity, e.g., manufacturing, distributing, or retail
1994]
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Thus, once a plaintiff presents a threshold case of an activity that is illegal
per se, there is generally no inquiry into the facts when determining anti-
trust liability. '
The stark contrast between the rule of reason and the per se rule may
be less pronounced than the respective analyses indicate. Justice Powell
once commented that characterization of an activity is the only real dif-
ference between the two tests; as such, per se analysis is really not a ques-
tion of labels as much as applying labels to' conduct.47 In addition, there
are a variety of immunities and related doctrines that complicate the ap-
plication of these basic tests in certain situations, particularly activities of
the learned professions.48
C. Enforcement
Enforcement of federal antitrust laws comes from several sources. The
federal government may bring actions either through the Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. However, the overwhelming
majority of antitrust actions are private, brought either by private citizens
or by the states in their "parens patriae" capacity on behalf of their re-
spective citizens.49 The states also enforce their own antitrust laws, which
sales. 'lying arrangements involve situations in which the sale of one product or service is
"tied" to the purchase of another product or service. Lastly, the type of group boycott
subject to per se analysis is a matter of debate. For example, Circuit Judge Posner feels
that such activity cannot be considered per se illegal unless the boycotts are used to en-
force agreements that are themselves illegal per se. Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083, 1093 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 470
U.S. 373 (1985).
46. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 297-98 (1985).
47. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 362 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
48. The learned professions doctrine generally affords rule of reason analysis to pro-
fessional activities that involve public service or ethical norms. See infra note 85 and ac-
companying text. The doctrine does not fashion a broad antitrust exemption for the
professions under the rule of reason. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). In
addition, there is true antitrust immunity for state action under the Parker doctrine, and for
legislative advocacy under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. There is no state involvement in
the specialty board system at present. The topic of legislative advocacy and the boards is
beyond the scope of this analysis.
49. During the 1980s, there were 10 private suits for every suit brought by the federal
government. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY
AND PROCEDURE 77 (2d ed. 1989).
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are assuming a growing importance in antitrust litigation.50
III. ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO THE SPECIALTY BOARDS
A. A Historical Perspective
Concern about antitrust liability for the activities of specialty boards is
almost as old as the boards themselves. Much of the early anxiety fo-
cused on a 1943 decision, American Medical Ass'n v. United States, in-
volving an attempt by the AMA and the Medical Society of the District
of Columbia to undermine a government prepaid health plan.51 The
Court had little problem finding antitrust liability in the scheme, in which
hospitals participating in the plan were threatened with loss of AMA ap-
proval for their postgraduate physician training programs, and participat-
ing physicians were threatened with loss of membership in both the AMA
and District of Columbia Medical Society. 2 The holding left no doubt
that organized medicine was subject to antitrust laws, and that antitrust
liability applied to attempts by organized medicine to limit the practice of
physicians and influence hospital policies.
At the time of American Medical Ass'n, many hospitals and specialty
boards were advocating certification as an essential requirement for
granting hospital privileges. In the wake of American Medical Ass'n,
those organizations began to rethink their position.53 In 1947, the
AMA's Council on Medical Education disclaimed any responsibility for
encouraging board certification as an important credential for hospital
staff appointments.54 Subsequently, the Advisory Board for Medical
Specialties (predecessor of the ABMS), the American Board of Surgery,
and several other boards adopted the position that they were not con-
cerned with hospital privileges for board-certified physicians.55
The specialty board policy disclaiming any particular use of their certif-
icates continues to this day. For example, the ABMS's general statement
on the purpose of certification reads:
The intent of the certification process, as defined by the Mem-
50. An analysis of state antitrust laws and their implications is beyond the scope of this
discussion.
51. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). It is important to
note such a plan was quite revolutionary at the time, and was viewed as an economic threat
by organized medicine.
52. Id.
53. STEVENS, supra note 22, at 307.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 308.
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ber Boards of the American Board of Medical Specialties, is to
provide assurance to the public that a certified medical specialist
has successfully completed an approved educational program
and an evaluation, including an examination process designed to
assess the knowledge, experience and skills requisite to the pro-
vision of high quality patient care in that specialty. 6
This position is reinforced by the ABMS's Statement on the Delineation
of Staff Privileges. The ABMS's statement recognizes that certification
may be considered as "only one of several valid and important criteria" in
granting staff privileges, but it emphasizes that it does not specifically re-
quire a physician to be board-certified to obtain hospital privileges in a
specialty or subspecialty. 7
B. The Argument for Antitrust Liability
Despite the position of the ABMS and the specialty boards, there is no
question that board certification does have some effect on commerce.
This effect may be characterized as a restraint of trade under a number of
theories.
1. The Necessity of Economic Significance
Any antitrust theory invoked against the specialty boards must be
based on the contention that certification carries with it considerable eco-
nomic significance. Without such economic impact, denial of certification
could not be characterized as restraining trade.
There is no question that the boards have an economic effect on physi-
cians' practice through third party use of certification standards. How-
ever, it is not clear that setting these standards - since meeting the
standards is not a legal requirement to practice medicine 58 - affects
commerce to the degree that would invoke antitrust liability.59 In addi-
56. ABMS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 51.
57. Id. at 52-53.
58. The overwhelming majority of U.S. jurisdictions do not legally require board certi-
fication to practice medicine. In a notable exception, New York State, beginning in 1993,
requires emergency room physicians to be board certified or board eligible in emergency
medicine, family medicine, internal medicine, or surgery in order to practice. This require-
ment has led to an antitrust challenge to the certification requirements of the American
Board of Emergency Medicine. See Daniel v. American Bd. of Emergency Medicine, 802
F. Supp. 912 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). The case is described infra note 78.
59. This lack of board impact on commerce is implied in Flegel v. Christian Hosp.
Northeast-Northwest, 804 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D. Mo. 1992), reh'g denied, 4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir.
1993) (involving a requirement of ABMS certification or board-eligible status for hospital
privileges). See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text. The Flegel court upheld the
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tion, the absence of direct or indirect board activity to enforce any partic-
ular application of certification standards makes it very difficult to
demonstrate that board conduct has any direct commercial effect at all,
let alone an impact which could be considered a restraint of trade.'
2. Group Boycott or Refusal to Deal
Under current antitrust doctrine, board certification is most easily
characterized as a group boycott or refusal to deal, as the boards simply
grant or deny a physician the privilege of certification.61 A basic group
boycott/refusal to deal claim could involve allegations of a conspiracy be-
tween a certifying board and a hospital that requires board certification
for staff privileges, a conspiracy which limits the practice of non-certified
physicians and consequently restrains trade.62
The structure of the boards themselves may contain elements of a
group boycott/refusal to deal theory. As organizations comprised of phy-
sician specialists - potential competitors who set standards for them-
selves and other physician-competitors in the various specialty fields -
the boards could be characterized as conspiracies among competitors in
restraint of trade. The Supreme Court, in American Society of Mechani-
cal Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.6 3 and in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.
use of the ABMS certificates as prerequisites for staff privileges, but failed even to address
the standard-setting activities of the boards in its discussion of the merits. Where certifica-
tion is legally required for the practice of a medical specialty, as in Daniel, the impact of
certification requirements on commerce becomes much more concrete, and may actually
rise to the level necessary to prevail in an antitrust action. See infra note 78.
60. Note how this argument parallels the argument made in Schachar v. American
Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989), in which the court looked
to the nature of ophthalmological services, with literally thousands of "competitors," and
the lack of any enforcement mechanism for a position taken by the academy. The court
then went on to hold that there can be no restraint of trade without a restraint. See infra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
61. Note that under a group boycott theory, the right or privilege at issue does not
have to constitute an "essential facility." See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the essential facilities doctrine).
62. Lending additional weight to such an argument is the general nature of the license
held by all physicians who can legally render medical care: as such a license technically
grants its holder the unrestricted right to practice medicine, any certification mechanism
that denies this right may be seen as an illegal restraint of trade.
. 63. 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (involving a nonprofit organization that promulgated widely-
adopted advisory codes). The society was found to be liable under the antitrust laws be-
cause its members, who were also officers in a firm which competed with the plaintiff firm,
used their position within the society to economically disadvantage the plaintiff firm. Id. at
565-66. The Court held that principals, in this case the society, are liable when their agents
(members) act with apparent authority. The Court defined such authority as "the power to
19941
208 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 10:195
v. Indian Head, Inc.,' has explicitly recognized that such organizational
structures carry with them the risk of anticompetitive effects. 65
Any group boycott/refusal to deal claim based on a pure conspiracy or
a conspiracy among competitors theory faces a significant obstacle in the
establishment of an underlying conspiracy: a party alleging that conspir-
acy must produce evidence to exclude the possibility that "conspirators"
acted independently. The party alleging a conspiracy must exclude this
possibility in order to prove a conscious commitment to a common
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.66 In the context of
board certification, a party must produce actual evidence that the boards
conspired either with other entities or with their own members acting as
individuals to prove the required conspiracy; a mere possibility of such a
conspiracy is not sufficient.67
The boards may also be implicated under another type of group boy-
cott theory, the "essential facilities" doctrine.6 The doctrine is applica-
ble to situations in which an organization denies an economically vital
affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly
as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to
such third persons." Id. at 566 n.5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957)).
Justice Powell, dissenting, noted a real danger in the Hydrolevel ruling: the possibility of
extending antitrust liability to standard setting organizations, even though the actions of
the agent were never ratified or authorized, and even though the organization derived no
benefit whatsoever from the fraudulent actions of the agent. Id. at 579 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
64. 486 U.S. 492 (1988). In Allied Tube, the Court noted the potential for serious
anitcompetitive harm where a standard-setting organization is composed of competitors
with both horizontal and vertical business relationships. Id. at 500 (citing 7 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 373 (1986)).
65. This rationale is seen in Daniel v. American Bd. of Emergency Medicine, 802 F.
Supp. 912 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), in which a physician challenged a board's refusal to admit him
to the certification examination in Emergency Medicine. In refusing to dismiss the com-
plaint, the district court observed that the board resembled a professional association, as
the board itself was composed of physicians who had taken and passed the certification
examination in emergency medicine. Id. at 924 (citations omitted).
66. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 375 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
982 (1990) (citing Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
597-98 (1986); Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Servs., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
67. It is doubtful that a board member, acting in his or her official capacity, could be
viewed as conspiring with his or her own board in undertaking an official board action.
68. The essential facilities doctrine originated in Court decisions that actually involved
refusals to deal. See, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), Asso-
ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The concept of an essential facility is
similar to that of monopolization. Violations occur when a competitor is denied access to
another party's facility that the competitor requires in order to do business. For a more
complete discussion of the doctrine, see SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 590-
92.
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"good" to a third party.69 Its relevance to board certification is implicitly
confirmed in the latest chapter of Marrese v. American Academy of Or-
thopedic Surgeons.7' The Seventh Circuit referred to certification in par-
allel with licensure as a key requirement to practice medicine: as a
medical license is an absolute requirement to practice medicine, this
treatment indicates that the court believed certification to be similarly
important.71 Despite the Marrese court's reasoning, it would be very dif-
ficult to demonstrate that certification is an "essential facility," as certifi-
cation is not an absolute requirement to practice specialty medicine.72
3. The Specialty Boards as a Monopoly
It may be possible to characterize the boards as either a monopoly or
an attempt to monopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It is im-
portant to note that Section 2 does not render an organization illegal
merely because it constitutes a monopoly. Rather, a monopoly and some
anticompetitive conduct is necessary for a violation.73
According to an often-discussed Section 2 theory, certification acts as a
restriction to protect certified physicians from the legitimate competition
of noncertified physicians.74 An ancillary argument under this theory is
that the boards are designed to protect the existing "turf" of organized
medicine, by preventing the formation of new specialties and
subspecialties.75
69. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (finding antitrust
liability where the Exchange denied a nonmember private wire connections to member
brokers). The Court characterized the Exchange's actions as amounting to a per se illegal
group boycott, but in the face of specific federal legislation regulating the exchange, re-
fused to apply a per se rule. Id. at 347.
70. Nos. 91-1366 and 91-1508, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25530 (7th Cir. 1992) (unpub-
lished order).
71. Id. at *16.
72. See Goussis v. Kimball, 813 F. Supp. 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (specifically finding
that certification is not necessary to practice medicine in the context of an international
medical graduate's challenge to the ABIM's subspecialty certification system). The only
absolute requirement to practice any type of medicine in the U.S. is a valid state medical
license.
73. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
74. Joel I. Klein, The Antitrust Laws and Medical Specialty Certification, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION 17, 20 (Donald G. Langsley ed., 1983).
A variation of this theory is "attempted monopolization," which is another Section 2 viola-
tion. See Daniel, 802 F. Supp. at 927 (allowing an attempted monopolization allegation to
survive a motion to dismiss in legal action against the American Board of Emergency
Medicine).
75. Klein, supra note 74, at 20.
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A successful Section 2 claim requires demonstration of market power,
which may be difficult to establish, given the questionable impact of
board activities on'commerce.76 Even if such market power is found, Sec-
tion 2 demands anticompetitive conduct, in the form of either willful ac-
quisition or maintenance of market power, a difficult burden when a
board has taken no action to preserve its preeminent position.77
C. Judicial Application of Antitrust Doctrine to Issues in Board
Certification
There are a number of theories under which the specialty boards could
be subject to liability under current antitrust doctrine. While antitrust
suits are commonly filed against health care institutions and professional
societies, federal antitrust actions with the specialty boards as named par-
ties are rare.78 Potential board liability is thus largely analyzed by anal-
ogy to cases where private parties establish standards in the name of
quality or safety. These standards may have the ancillary effect of re-
straining competition.
1. Direct Application of "Private" Standards To Third Parties
This line of cases involves private parties who formulate and then apply
standards to third parties, a fact pattern very similar to that found in the
specialty boards' private system of regulation.
76. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (describing the boards' effect on
commerce).
77. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
78. There is only one reported federal antitrust action involving a specialty board.
Daniel v. American Bd. of Emergency Medicine, 802 F. Supp. 912 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (in-
volving an antitrust challenge to the board's actions in discontinuing the so-called "practice
track"). The practice track allowed practicing emergency physicians, who met specified
conditions, to sit for the certification examination in Emergency Medicine without the
need to complete a residency in Emergency Medicine. Plaintiff Daniel, who had com-
pleted a residency in General Surgery, failed to satisfy the conditions before the "practice
track" was discontinued in 1988; after the Board refused to admit him to the exam, he filed
suit, requesting an injunction to gain admission to the certification examination. The case
was complicated by New York state law, which required the plaintiff to be board certified
in order to practice emergency room medicine. See supra note 58.
Daniel is only a district court ruling upholding a magistrate's order refusing to dismiss
the complaint. The lack of a holding on the substantive issues involved, the absence of an
appellate court ruling, and the presence of the New York law requiring certification for
Emergency Medicine practice all lessen the precedential value of the case. Nonetheless, it
demonstrates that federal courts will entertain antitrust actions against the specialty
boards.
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a. Medical Organizations and Admission Standards
Courts have generally supported the right of medical organizations to
limit admission to their membership as they see fit. An example is Mar-
rese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, in which the Seventh
Circuit found no restraint of trade where an orthopedic surgeon was de-
nied membership in an organization that allowed members to associate
with or refer patients to nonmembers.79 The court added that even if the
denial of membership "stigmatized" the physician who was denied admis-
sion, such stigmatism did not affect competition in a way that would in-
voke the antitrust laws.80
There is no Supreme Court decision addressing the right of a medical
organization to set standards and limit membership. However, in North-
west Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., the
Court upheld the right of a buying cooperative to exclude a potential
competitor from its organization.81 This freedom to exclude exists unless
an organization possesses market power or exclusive access to an element
necessary for effective competition; if either condition is present, how-
ever, there is the possibility that exclusion will have an anticompetitive
effect.82
Marrese appears to follow the line of "necessary element" analysis the
Court alluded to in Northwest Wholesale Stationers.3 Specifically, the
Marrese court implied that certification may actually be an "essential ele-
ment" of competition such that its denial may have an anticompetitive
effect.' Thus, denial of board certification may not be evaluated under
the same lenient analysis as denial of membership in a medical specialty
society.
79. Marrese, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25530.
80. Id. at *18-19.
81. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985). This case marked the beginning of a relaxation of antitrust law as applied
to group boycotts, generally subjecting such activities to the rule of reason.
82. Id. at 296.
83. Note also the analogy to the essential facilities doctrine supra notes 68-72 and
accompanying text.
84. Marrese, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25530, at *16 (noting that denial of membership in
a professional organization did not constitute a restraint of trade and that membership was
not necessary for either licensure or to take board examinations). Discussing a key re-
quirement for board certification in parallel with medical licensure, an absolute require-
ment for the practice of medicine, indicates that the Marrese court considered certification
to be of great importance in the practice of medicine.
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b. Setting "Industry Wide" Standards
Courts generally afford deferential treatment to standards set by pro-
fessional organizations, particularly when an organization can demon-
strate legitimate safety or ethical considerations underlying those
standards. As stated in National Society of Professional Engineers, ethi-
cal norms that promote and regulate competition within a profession are
subject to a rule of reason analysis. a5 Justice Blackmun, concurring in
National Society of Professional Engineers, clearly felt that this rule of
reason treatment should be extended to ethical rules with more than "de
minimis" anticompetitive effects. He specifically noted "[a] medical asso-
ciation's prescription of standards of minimum competence for licensing
or certification.. ." as one such case.86
The Court reinforced this rule of reason analysis in Allied Tube, in
which competitors adopted industry-wide standards by consensus.87 Spe-
cifically, the opinion recognized the potential for pro-competitive benefits
of safety standards based on objective, expert judgement, if the private
organizations setting such standards employ procedures that prevent the
process from being abused.88 Medical specialty boards may be character-
ized as such organizations, entitled to rule of reason analysis when their
standards are the product of reasonable and fairly applied decision-mak-
ing mechanisms.
The Court addressed private standard setting in the provision of health
care in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.89
There, rule of reason analysis was invoked where a dental society refused
to provide x-rays to third party payers, with the Court noting its reluc-
tance to condemn rules adopted by professional organizations as illegal
per se.9 Taken together with National Society of Professional Engineers
85. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (ad-
dressing the "learned professions" doctrine). According to this doctrine, the professions
are afforded special treatment under antitrust laws, following the Supreme Court's sound
rejection of an unqualified antitrust exception for the professions. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at
788-98 n.17. The Court used the opportunity provided by National Soc'y of Professional
Engineers to further refine the doctrine, holding that the professions were entitled to rule
of reason treatment in situations involving ethical norms which promote and regulate com-
petition 435 U.S. at 696.
86. 435 U.S. at 700 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. Allied Tuibe & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
88. Id. at 500.
89. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
90. Id. at 458. Though the Court nominally applied rule of reason analysis in ruling
against the Federation, it did not consider the market effects of the challenged restraint.
As the rule of reason normally includes such analysis, the test applied in Indiana Fed'n of
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and Allied Tube, this decision strongly suggests that private, standard-set-
ting organizations such as the boards are entitled to rule of reason
analysis.
Lower courts generally afford similar if not greater deference to pri-
vate, standard-setting organizations. Marjorie Webster Junior College v.
Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., dealt with a
proprietary junior college's antitrust challenge to a voluntary, nonprofit
accreditation association's policy of refusing to extend accreditation to
for-profit institutions.91 In declining to find antitrust liability, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that antitrust
laws are not applicable to restrictions that are not commercial, that only
incidentally restrain trade, and that are not intended to have an effect on
the commercial aspects of a profession.92
This same lower court deference has been applied to certain standards
established by private medical groups. Schachar v. American Academy of
Ophthalmology examined an Academy statement endorsing a National
Eye Institute report classifying "radial keratotomy" as an experimental
procedure; a group of ophthalmologists who performed the operation
claimed that this statement decreased demand for their services and
therefore restrained trade.93 The Schachar court held that where
thousands of providers are present in a market such as ophthalmology,
Dentists is often considered something less than the rule of reason. A partial explanation
for this treatment may lie in the practice's prior history. Originally, the Indiana Dental
Association formulated the policy of refusing to provide third-party payers with x-rays, but
the association was subsequently subject to an FTC consent decree, which ordered it to
cease and desist the practice on antitrust grounds. The Indiana Federation of Dentists, a
much smaller splinter group of the Indiana Dental Association, was founded as an organi-
zation opposed to the consent decree and committed to continuing the policy of denying x-
rays to third parties. Thus, there was little question that the actions of the Federation
constituted antitrust violations as outlined in the consent decree. The situation was compli-
cated by the quality of care argument presented by the federation, a contention which
probably weighed in favor of some type of rule of reason analysis, despite the almost cer-
tain illegality of the practice itself.
91. Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
92. Id. at 654. The court's deference to the "learned professions" may have antici-
pated the rule of reason approach of the later Goldfarb decision.
93. Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989).
Radial keratotomy corrects the optical defect that produces nearsightedness. The proce-
dure involves making a number of small incisions in the eye itself. The Academy's en-
dorsement of the institute's position can almost certainly be characterized as a safety
standard, given radial keratotomy's similarity to an unsuccessful procedure attempted in
the 1950s.
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there must be an enforcement mechanism to effect a restraint of trade.94
This decision potentially affords specialty boards great latitude in setting
standards under antitrust law, as long as no formal or informal mecha-
nisms to "enforce" the standards are employed.95
The Seventh Circuit also applied a rule of reason analysis to a medical
association's ethical standards. In Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, a
group of chiropractors alleged that the AMA and other physicians' and
hospital groups had been engaged in an illegal restraint of trade directed
against the chiropractic profession.96 Key to this alleged antitrust viola-
tion were the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, which provided that
"[a] physician should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific
basis; and he should not voluntarily associate with anyone who violates
this principle."9  Chiropractors had been determined to be "unscientific
practitioners" by the AMA, thus excluding their interaction with AMA
members.98
Despite this blatant restriction and evidence which tended to support
the contention that economic and not scientific considerations actually
formed the basis for the AMA's position, the court applied the rule of
reason. According to the court, a canon of medical ethics, not unfrivo-
lously purporting to address the importance of the scientific method,
gives rise to questions of sufficient delicacy and novelty as to escape per
se treatment.99 Though the court went on to hold that the AMA's con-
duct did in fact violate antitrust laws, it noted that a legitimate concern
for patient care would have served as a justifiable excuse for the Associa-
tion's activities."° Specifically, the court stated that four factors should
be considered in determining if such an excuse exists: (1) whether the
association genuinely entertained a concern for what they perceive as the
scientific method in the care of each person with whom they have entered
into a doctor-patient relationship; (2) whether this concern is objectively
reasonable; (3) whether this concern had been the dominant motivating
94. Id. at 399. In addition, the court held that the "towering reputation" of an organi-
zation does not prevent it from speaking out on a subject of concern. Id.
95. Note that this "no enforcement" requirement closely parallels the current "hands
off" policy of the boards with regard to the ultimate use(s) of their certificates. Thus,
under the rationale of Schachar, it would be difficult to successfully attack the current
specialty board scheme on antitrust grounds.
96. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990).
97. Id. at 355 n.1 (quoting AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, Former Principle 3).
98. Id. at 355.
99. Id. at 359.
100. Id. at 362.
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factor in the decision to promulgate an ethical standard and the conduct
intended to implement it; and (4).whether this concern for the scientific
method in patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a man-
ner less restrictive of competition. 01
Wilk and Schachar, in conjunction with related Supreme Court prece-
dent, indicate that private medical organizations which set legitimate, un-
enforced medical practice standards would most likely receive the
deferential rule of reason analysis in the face of an antitrust challenge.
This rationale is clearly applicable to the boards as private entities
promulgating non-binding professional standards.
c. Hospital Privileges
The process by which hospital privileges are extended, denied or termi-
nated involves decisions by private and public actors, ostensibly based on
patient safety and quality of care considerations."° Staff privilege deci-
sions are therefore a direct application of "institutional" standards to an
individual physician, which may seriously affect that physician's ability to
practice medicine. When the denial or termination of privileges results in
a legal challenge, antitrust allegations are usually included as part of an
"arsenal" of federal and state claims against the involved institution.
Courts addressing such antitrust challenges are overwhelmingly defer-
ential to hospital staffing decisions where legitimate medical reasons form
the basis for denial or termination of privileges. 103 This deference has
been extended to the use of peer review in privilege decisions."° Many
courts have also held that a medical staff is entitled to exclude a physician
on grounds of unprofessional conduct as well as professional
incompetence.10 5
Court treatment of staff privilege decisions again illustrates the judicial
101. Id. (quoting Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983)).
102. Whether these decisions are made by private or public actors depends on the na-
ture of the institution itself and the employment status of those taking part in the decision-
making process. Note also that economics can play a role in privilege decisions.
103. See Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 964 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1992); Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Nos. 91-1366 and 91-1508, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
25530, at *10 (7th Cir. Oct. 1, 1992); Brown v. Our Lady of Lourdes Medical Ctr., 767 F.
Supp. 618, 628 (D.N.J. 1991), affd without opinion, 961 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1992).
104. Marrese, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25530, at *9. Note that the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 has granted limited antitrust "immunity" to peer review. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 11111-11115 (1988). Some, however, feel that the qualifications to this "immu-
nity" are such that its protections lack practical effect. See generally Charity Scott, Medical
Peer Review, Antitrust, and the Effect of Statutory Reform, 50 MD. L. REV. 316 (1991).
105. See Brown, 767 F. Supp. at 628.
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deference afforded to ostensibly medical decisions, even where the eco-
nomic effects of these decisions may be profound. This deference is espe-
cially notable because privilege committees are often composed of
physicians who are potential competitors of those challenging the privi-
lege decision. Given the medical nature of specialty board decisions,
their economic effect, and the presence of physician-competitors on the
boards, a strong analogy can be drawn between the antitrust issues con-
fronting the boards and hospital privilege decisions: demonstrated judi-
cial deference in the context of privilege decisions indicates a tendency
towards such deference with the boards.
2. Application of Specialty Board Standards by Third Parties
While the private standards established by the specialty boards have
not been the subject of a direct antitrust challenge, these standards and
those of similar professional organizations have been used as a basis for
decisions by third parties. Challenges based on these third-party deci-
sions give insight into prospective judicial treatment of the standards
themselves, and provide perhaps the best evidence of the judicial defer-
ence likely to be applied to direct antitrust challenges of the boards.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on an antitrust challenge to the
application of specialty board standards by third parties, though several
notable lower federal court decisions have addressed similar questions.
In Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia,
the Fourth Circuit found that a joint refusal by Blue Shield of Virginia
and another plan to reimburse its insureds directly for the services of psy-
chologists violated the Sherman Act.10 6 The position of Blue Shield was
at least partially due to the recommendation of a physicians' specialty
society, the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia. 7 Despite its role in
establishing what was found to be an illegal restraint of trade, the court
held that the society could advocate its position without antitrust liability,
so long as no coercion was employed to further that position.'08 Lawyers
familiar with board certification have cited this decision as support that
specialty boards may advocate the use of their certificates for various pur-
poses without incurring antitrust liability.'0 9
The Third Circuit addressed an indirect application of board standards
106. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 624 F.2d
476, 484-85 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
107. Id. at 483.
108. Id.
109. Klein, supra note 74, at 25.
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in Weiss v. York Hospital, where an osteopathic physician challenged his
denial of hospital privileges. The system at issue generally afforded os-
teopaths the lowest level of privileges, while allopathic physicians were
given higher levels based on skills established through board certifica-
tion." 0 The court held that per se treatment is normally applied to such a
group boycott, but noted that the rule of reason was appropriate where
the qualifications of health care professionals are at issue in privilege de-
cisions."' Though the court did not find that such qualifications were at
issue in the facts before it, the decision indicates that the use of specialty
board standards, and perhaps the content of the standards themselves,
may be subject to rule of reason analysis where medical qualifications are
being evaluated.
Perhaps the most important antitrust case in which specialty board
standards were an issue is Flegel v. Christian Hospital Northeast-North-
west.1 1 2 Flegel, like Weiss, addressed a challenge by osteopathic physi-
cians to hospital privilege decisions employing board standards.
Importantly, Christian Hospital did not merely assign a level of hospital
privileges linked to board certification; it required certification by an
ABMS-recognized board, or eligibility for such certification, to qualify
for privileges." 3 Several reasons were offered by the institution to justify
this position: (1) to enhance the reputation of the hospital; (2) to respond
to community concerns about the hospital's quality; and (3) to satisfy the
requirements of hospital accrediting organizations." 4
The Flegel court, applying rule of reason analysis to the hospital's privi-
lege policy, found no violation of antitrust laws.' 15 Importantly, the court
noted that the conduct of the institution did not fall into a category likely
to have predominantly anticompetitive effects, nor was the economic im-
pact of the practice immediately obvious." 6 As the standards of board
certification were the de facto requirement for privileges at Christian
110. Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 791-96 (3d Cir. 1984).
111. Id. at 820.
112. 804 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D. Mo. 1992), affd, 4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1993).
113. Id. at 1169.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1172. Interestingly, the district court also found no constitutional equal pro-
tection violation as a result of this policy. The Eighth Circuit did not reach this issue.
116. Id. at 1173. The appellate court declined to make such a general holding, focusing
instead on the facts before it and concluding there was insufficient evidence of actual detri-
mental effects on competition. Flegel v. Christian Hosp. Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 682,
688-89 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Hospital, the decision may be seen as explicit judicial approval of the
board's substantive standards.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE BOARDS AND ANTITRUST
There are no major cases addressing substantive federal antitrust issues
in the context of board certification, thus making definitive analysis im-
possible. Decisions addressing organizations and issues similar to those
found in board certification do, however, give respectable insight into
possible treatment of the specialty boards.
Emerging from this case law are several trends. Initially, courts appear
to favor the application of the rule of reason to legitimate professional
standards promulgated by private organizations. The availability of this
treatment, and the deference afforded by the courts in actually applying
it, appear to depend heavily on one and perhaps two factors. The key
consideration is whether the record suggests that the standard at issue
was promulgated primarily for economic reasons. If such a motive is
present, courts will either apply a per se rule, or quickly find liability
while ostensibly applying the rule of reason. 117 Another qualification
may exist where the privilege or benefit denied by application of private
standards effectively prevents an individual from engaging in an eco-
nomic activity, i.e., the privilege or benefit is of paramount commercial
significance." 8 Should neither condition exist, there is strong evidence of
significant judicial deference under the rule of reason to medical or aca-
demic standard decisions. 119
The specialty boards as they presently exist promulgate certification
standards based on the medical knowledge deemed necessary to practice
117. Federal rade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) ostensibly
involved application of the rule of reason, although the Court wasted relatively little time
in finding antitrust liability where the federation's motives in denying third-party payers x-
rays appeared to have more to do with economics than with quality of care. See supra
notes 89-90 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d at 820, where
the court explained why the rule of reason should be applied to hospital privilege decisions
involving the qualifications of health professionals, and then upheld the application of a
per se rule where osteopaths were denied hospital privileges. See supra notes 110-111 and
accompanying text.
118. For examples of this "essential element" analysis, see Northwest Wholesale Station-
ers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 296; Marrese, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25530, at *16.
119. See Flegel, 804 F. Supp. at 1173 (upholding use of ABMS certificates as a prerequi-
site to hospital staff privileges); Marjorie Webster Junior College, 432 F.2d at 654 (involving
a policy of an academic accrediting organization to deny accreditation to proprietary insti-
tutions). In both instances, the practice at issue had significant economic effects on the
parties denied the benefit or privilege, yet no antitrust liability was found.
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high-quality specialty medicine; economics plays no explicit role in this
decision-making process. In addition, certification is not essential to
practice medicine, nor is there any concerted effort on the part of the
boards or organized medicine to enforce a particular use(s) of certifica-
tion standards. These realities make the commercial significance of board
certification activities tenuous at best. Given the lack of both an underly-
ing economic motive and commercial impact, it is highly likely that any
antitrust challenge to the specialty boards would be evaluated under a
deferential rule of reason analysis, an analysis which does not pose a seri-
ous threat of liability.
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